Artificial Intelligence systems require a through assessment of different pillars of trust, namely, fairness, interpretability, data and model privacy, reliability (safety) and robustness against against adversarial attacks. While these research problems have been extensively studied in isolation, an understanding of the trade-off between different pillars of trust is lacking. To this extent, the trade-off between fault tolerance, privacy and adversarial robustness is evaluated for the specific case of Deep Neural Networks, by considering two adversarial settings under a security and a privacy threat model. Specifically, this work studies the impact of the fault tolerance of the Neural Network on training the model by adding noise to the input (Adversarial Robustness) and noise to the gradients (Differential Privacy). While training models with noise to inputs, gradients or weights enhances fault tolerance, it is observed that adversarial robustness and fault tolerance are at odds with each other. On the other hand, (ǫ, δ)-Differentially Private models enhance the fault tolerance, measured using generalisation error, theoretically has an upper bound of e ǫ − 1 + δ. This novel study of the tradeoff between different elements of trust is pivotal for training a model which satisfies the requirements for different pillars of trust simultaneously. The code used for experiments are available at: https://gitlab.com/vduddu/FaultToleranceNoise.
Introduction
The growing reliance on Artificial Intelligence in safety critical real time applications such as satellites, autonomous vehicles like unmanned aerial vehicles and space rovers, requires designing trustworthy AI systems. Such applications with high stakes decision making are required to satisfy fairness among disparate groups, privacy of individuals in the training data, robustness against adversarially perturbed inputs, enhanced fault tolerance for safety and ensure model interpretability. Hence, it is crucial to understand the tradeoffs between different aspects of trust for designing efficient Pareto-optimal solutions. In order to address this requirement, this research analyses the impact of training machine learning models, specifically Deep Neural Networks, for adversarial robustness (security) and differential privacy on the model's fault tolerance (reliability).
Fault Tolerance is a crucial property for Neural Networks to ensure reliable computation for long duration and graceful degradation over time. Typically, well generalised models have the parameters with low variance ensuring equal computational weightage to all nodes in the network. Hence, loss of some of the nodes can be compensated by other nodes without a significant loss in performance (Dey et al. 2018 ) (Deodhare, Vidyasagar, and Sathiya Keethi 1998) (Neti, Schneider, and Young 1992) . Practically, this is achieved by adding noise during training to the inputs, gradients or the weights.
The noise added to the inputs can be modelled as Tikhonov regularisation which enhances the generalisation (Bishop 1995) . However, in an adversarial setting under a security threat model, carefully crafted imperceptible noise can be added to input images by an adversary, to force the model to misclassify the image and violating the confidentiality of the model prediction. The design of the Neural Networks within such an adversarial setting requires training on inputs with adversarial noise to ensure robustness against adversary's worst case perturbation. The goal of this work in this setting, is to address the research question,
What is the impact of adversarially robust training (input noise) on fault tolerance? Alternatively, in an adversarial setting under a privacy threat model, an adversary performs inference attacks to identify training data attributes or membership details for sampled data point. This poses a serious privacy risk for sensitive training data such as financial and medical records, personal photos, location history and preferences. Differential Privacy provides provable guarantee on the maximum privacy leakage by making the data points indistinguishable using gradient noise during training (Abadi et al. 2016 
for ǫ > 0 and X ∈ D. Fault Tolerance Metric. Improving the generalisation, results in enhancing the fault tolerance and vice versa (Bernier et al. 2001) . Hence, capturing the overfitting of the model provides a way to compare the relative fault tolerance of multiple models which has been extensively used in literature to measure fault tolerance of Neural networks (Wang et al. 2018 ) (Duddu, Rao, and Balas 2019) . Formally, given a dataset D test such that D train ∩D test = φ, the accuracy of the model is estimated on the training set R train and on the testing set R test . The generalisation error is given by the difference between training accuracy and the testing accuracy,
This gives the estimate of overfitting in the neural network (R train > R test ), i.e, higher the generalisation error more the overfitting. This estimate of fault tolerance is used for evaluation of different Neural Networks throughout the paper. Fault Model. In this work, the fault occurring in the hardware is simulated in the form of stuck at "0" errors in the Neural network computation. Further, multiple faults can occur simultaneously for which the goal is measure the performance of the model using test accuracy. The faults are simulated in two major ways: firstly, these faults can manifest in the form of random node crashes in the Neural Network due to which the output of the neurone is always put to zero. Secondly, the parameters of the Neural Networks can be stuck at "0" which includes both the weights in case of Multi Layer Perceptron and the filter and kernel values in case of convolutional neural networks. This is a common fault model frequently used in evaluating the reliability of systems (Duddu, Rao, and Balas 2019) .
Related Work. A widely used approach for enhancing fault tolerance is to penalize large values of the parameters by a regularisation func-tion (Dey et al. 2018 ) (Wang et al. 2018 ). Alternatively, constraint optimisation approaches using minimax constraint (Neti, Schneider, and Young 1992) as well as quadratic programming (Deodhare, Vidyasagar, and Sathiya Keethi 1998) can be used for very small networks. Unlike simple regularisation functions, unsupervised pre-training of the initial network layers followed by supervised fine-tuning can significantly enhance the fault tolerance (Duddu, Rao, and Balas 2019) . Traditional techniques to enhance reliability such as additional redundancy by adding nodes and synapses (Phatak and Koren 1995) provides partial fault tolerance.
Adversarial Robustness
Within the adversarial setting with a security adversary, the problem of adversarial robustness is modelled as a game between the attacker and defender with conflicting interests. Here, the adversary wants to force the target model to misclassify by adding carefully calculated noise to input, while the defender wants to train the model to defend against such inputs with adversarial noise.
Attacker Knowledge. In this work, the adversary has no knowledge about the target model. In other words, the adversary has a remote access to the target black box model and can query the model and receive corresponding predictions through an API. This is typically the black box setting seen in Machine Learning as a Service.
Attacker Goal. The goal of the adversary is to find the noise to maximise the loss of the target model and force the model to misclassify the perturbed input. Formally, given an input x ∈ P (X, Y ), the adversary computes the worst case adversarial noise δ with the goal to maximise the loss,
subject to ∆ = {δ : ||δ|| p ≤ ǫ} (4) The optimisation is subjected to the condition that the noise is imperceptible by restricting δ within a perturbation region ∆ defined by an l ∞ norm (Madry et al. 2018) .
Defender Strategy. In order to defend against the worst attack possible, the model is trained using adversarial inputs as part of the training data. Formally, this empirical defence can be modelled as a minmax optimisation problem given below,
Here, instead of just minimise the expected loss value over the data points sampled from the distribution, the optimisation solves for minimising the worst case loss over the data with adversarial noise. In other words, the defender minimises the loss corresponding to the worst case adversarial attack.
In this work, the defence which provides provable bounds to the defence against adversarial examples is considered. TRADES algorithm decomposes the prediction error for adversarial example as the sum of natural classification error and the boundary error and provide a tight differentiable upper bound ). This defence uses Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence between the output prediction difference between the benign sample and adversarial sample outputs for generating adversarial examples within the inner maximisation. (Sinha, Namkoong, and Duchi 2018) to ensure robustness. Alternatively, verification based defences use function transformations to compute the worst case loss to express the adversarial perturbations (Mirman, Gehr, and Vechev 2018) .
Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy is the de facto privacy standard which provides a strong privacy definition with provable bounds on how much information is leaked by a mechanism in terms of the privacy budget ǫ (Dwork and Roth 2014). The output of a randomized mechanism should not allow the adversary to learn any more about a individual than that could be learnt via the same analysis without the individual in the dataset. In this sense, this definition of privacy captures the individual's membership in the dataset. Definition 2. For a randomized mechanism M : X → Y is (ǫ, δ) differentially private on two neighbouring datasets D and D ′ differing by a individual data point, then for all outputs O ⊆ Y,
Here, the parameters ǫ is considered as the privacy budget and δ is considered as the failure probability (Dwork 2008).
A tighter and accurate estimation of the privacy loss can be computed using the Renyi Differential Privacy (Mironov 2017) which uses the Renyi divergence metric D α which applies to any moment of the privacy loss random variable. Definition 3. For a randomized mechanism M : X → Y is ǫ-Renyi differentially private of the order α, on two neighbouring datasets D and D ′ differing by a individual data point, then for all outputs O ⊆ Y,
Attacker Strategy. The goal of the attacker within the privacy setting, is to use inference attacks to leak training data details resulting in privacy violation where the training data is sensitive. Membership inference attacks are used to infer whether a given data point was used in the training data or not based on the difference in model predictions on training data and testing data (Shokri et al. 2017 ). On the other hand, attribute inference attacks aim to extract particular features of the training data (Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015) or the reconstruct the entire training data (Salem et al. 2019) . Another class of attacks, exploits the memorisation capacity of the model to extract the sensitive attributes in the data by querying the model (Carlini et al. 2019) .
Defender Strategy. The defender, in order, to reduce the success of the inference attacks utilises the notion of differential privacy to train the model with provable membership leakage guarantees. To this extent, the defender samples a noise from either a Laplace or Gaussian distribution proportional to the sensitivity of the model (S).
(9) In case of Deep Neural Networks, this noise is added to the gradients of the model and mitigates several of the attacker's inference strategies, however, at the cost of utility (Jayaraman and Evans 2019).
Related Work. In order to preserve the privacy against membership inference attacks, several empirical defences exit. For instance, the adversary's inference attack can be modelled as a min-max optimisation problem, where the target model is trained to minimise the adversary's maximum attack gain (Nasr, Shokri, and Houmansadr 2018) . Another line of defence, is to add noise to the output of the model, force the inference attack machine learning model to misclassify while ensuring the utility from the model output is not changes (Jia et al. 2019) . While, these approaches are empirical, all of them face utility privacy trade-off and do not provide a theoretical guarantee on the maximum leakage of the model. Hence, in this work, Differential Privacy based private training is used since it provides provable guarantees on the leakage of the model about the training data (Abadi et al. 2016 ). An alternative Differential Privacy based framework using a teacher-student ensemble approach (Papernot et al. 2018 ).
Experiment Setup
The code for training using TRADES adversarial algorithm, is based on the official source code from the authors 1 . Further, the official code of Tensorflow Privacy Library 2 for Differentially Private training, adapted it to different architectures and datasets.
Datasets
The evaluation and training of adversarially robust and differentially private models are done on two major benchmarking datasets, namely, FashionMNIST and CIFAR10.
FashionMNIST. The dataset is similar to the MNIST dataset and consists of a training set of 60,000 examples and a test set of 10,000 examples. Each data sample is a 28×28 grayscale image associated with a label from 10 classes such as boots, shirt, bag and so on.
CIFAR10. The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60000 32x32 colour images in 10 classes, with 6000 images per class. There are 50000 training images and 10000 test images.
Architectures
A Convolutional Deep Neural Network architecture is considered with nine convolutional layers and two hidden layers for CIFAR10 dataset since the dataset is complex with 32x32x3 image sizes. In case of FashionMNIST dataset, two different neural network architectures are used, a MultiLayer Perceptron and a Convolutional Neural Network. The Multi Layer Perceptron is a simple architecture with two hidden layers of 512 nodes each. On the other hand, the convolutional network contains two convolutional and two maxpool layers followed by a hidden layer. The details of the architecture are given in Appendix A.
Fault Tolerance and Adversarial Robustness Input Noise as a Regularizer
Adding noise to inputs has been shown to provide regularization effect that theoretically is equivalent to Tikhonov regularization (Bishop 1995) . In order to understand the effect on input noise to generalisation, a simple architecture of 500 hidden layers is considered for a binary classification problem and differentiating two types of circles. Two types of noise are considered, namely, additive gaussian noise and the multiplicative gaussian noise which are commonly used for enhancing the fault tolerance of neural networks by improving the generalisation (Ho, Leung, and Sum 2010) (Holmstrom and Koistinen 1992) (Matsuoka 1992 In case of additive noise, on adding a small noise of standard deviation of 0.01, the generalisation performance on the binary classification problem improves. However, on increasing the values of the standard deviation, the model starts to overfit the noisy training data and the performance starts to decline. A similar phenomenon is observed on training models in the presence of worst case adversarial noise as shown in the subsequent sections.
Adversarial Noise
For CIFAR10 dataset, the performance for robust training using TRADES and PGD are evaluated and compared with the baseline of Tikhonov Regularization. Tikhonov regularised models are used as a baseline since, training with input noise is shown as theoretically equivalent to Tikhonov function in the objective. As shown in For this FMNIST, the generalisation error for both the adversarial training algorithms, namely, TRADES algorithm is evaluated. As shown in Table 3 , the generalisation error for the models trained using adversarial noise is significantly higher compared to the generalisation of the Tikhonov regularisation and naturally trained model without any additional optimisations. This indicates that adversarially computed noise, in fact, has a negative effect on the fault tolerance. On evaluating the generalisation error on Multilayer Perceptron, the error varies from 3.29% for regularised model to 8.83% for robust models. A similar pattern is observed for a more complex Convolutional Neural Network, with the generalisation error from 4.40% for regularised model to 8.01% for robust models. 
Comparing Fault Tolerance through Parameter Distribution
Alternatively, another approach to estimate the fault tolerance is by evaluating the standard deviation of the trained model's parameter distribution (Duddu, Rao, and Balas 2019) . The standard deviation of the parameters θ of the model is written as,
whereθ is the average of all the parameter values and N is the total number of parameters in the model. Higher the standard deviation of the parameter distribution, more varied the parameters values due to which some nodes are given more importance over the others. Here, loss of those important nodes in case of random faults, result in a significant drop in accuracy. For low σ, the parameters give equal weightage to all the nodes inputs and hence, the loss of a few nodes does not impact the overall model performance.
In Figure 1 (left) for CIFAR10 dataset, the standard deviation of the trained robust model is 0.125378 compared to 0.032451 of the naturally trained model without adversarial robustness. For FMNIST dataset (Figure 1 (right) ), the standard deviation of the robust model was around 0.17901 while the standard deviation for regularized model was 0.023772. Further, the overall generalisation error during training is significantly higher for adversarially robust models. This indicates that the fault tolerance of models trained using adversarial noise is significantly less than than Tikhonov regularized model or naturally trained model. An important study is to evaluate the impact of increasing the overall range of perturbation added to the inputs, i.e, ǫ adv . Increasing ǫ adv , results in increasing the overall noise region from which the noise can be chosen. Thus, this results in a the strength of the noise added to the input.
Impact of
As seen in Table 4 , the overall fault tolerance measured as the difference in training and testing accuracy, increases with increasing in the noise budget ǫ adv . Specifically, for the case of Convolutional Neural network trained on CIFAR10 dataset, on increasing ǫ adv from 2/255 to 8/255, the generalisation error increases (equivalently fault tolerance decreases) from 8.19% to 17.22%. Since, the fault model considered in the paper is random stuck at "0" faults, these faults are simulated for adversarially robust models and compare them with Tikhonov regularised models. As seen in Figure 2 , on increasing the faults into the parameters from 50% to 90%, the accuracy drop in case of regularised model is 1.14% compared to 26.93% of the robust model. This confirms the above analysis, indicating that adversarially robust models are less fault tolerant to regularised models.
Simulation of Faults for Adversarially Robust Models

Differential Privacy and Fault Tolerance
For the Convolutional Neural Network (Table 5) , a clear trade-off between the generalisation error (fault tolerance) and the accuracy can be seen. A higher fault tolerance can be achieved at the cost of low test accuracy. This trade-off is also observed by other standard functions such as L1 and L2 regularizers, however, they do not provide privacy guarantees. As the privacy leakage bound ǫ dp is increased from 0.49 to 10 6 , the generalisation error increases from 0.75% to 4.40%.
Training Accuracy
Testing Accuracy Generalisation Error As seen in Table 6 for MLP based model, a similar pattern is observed where the generlisation error increases from 1.01% to 8.29% as the values of ǫ dp increases. Theorem 1. Given a Machine Learning Model trained using (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy, the model's fault tolerance metric, given by the generalisation error, is bounded by e ǫ − 1 + δ. Proof Sketch. Differential Privacy is a strong notion of stability where the change in the data point in the training data should not change the final output. Further, fault tolerance is also a notion of stability where a change in the model architecture should not change the final output. A Differentially private mechanism is also uniform RO stable and the generalisation error of the mechanism can be bounded by e ǫ − 1 + δ (Wang, Lei, and Fienberg 2016) . Since, generalisation error is used to measure the relative fault tolerance between different models, the corresponding fault tolerance is bounded by e ǫ − 1 + δ.
Given the data population P of all possible input and output pairs, the model is trained on a subset of data D train sampled from P by minimising the training error,
In order to evaluate the performance on any possible sample that the model might encounter, we evaluate the error on the testing dataset D test sampled from P , where
The generalisation error is given by the difference between the testing (E test ) and training error (E train ). A mechanism which satisfies (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy also satisfies uniform RO stability (Wang, Lei, and Fienberg 2016) . Hence, for datasets D and D' differing by a single data point,
Further, generalising this result for the training dataset and testing dataset,
Since, the fault tolerance is measured as the difference in the training and testing error, we can see that this is bounded by e ǫ − 1 + δ on training the model with (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy. This result on provable bound on generalisation error is based on the folklore theorem by Frank McSherry. For small values of ǫ, e ǫ ≈ 1 + ǫ and hence, e ǫ − 1 + δ can be written as ǫ + δ which is agreement with folklore theorem. Hence, training for privacy objective using Differential privacy provides an alternate approach for enhancing fault tolerance with a provable bound on the generalisation error.
Conclusions
Designing a trustworthy machine learning system requires to understand the trade-offs in different elements of trust. This work highlights the trade-offs between three such pillars of trust in machine learning, namely, reliability, privacy and adversarial robustness. This work considers two adversarial settings, with a security threat model where the adversary aims to force the model to misclassify by adding adversarial noise to the input and a privacy threat model where the adversary aims to infer whether a data point was part of the sensitive training data or not. Under the security threat model, the impact of fault tolerance on adversarially robust neural networks is evaluated and it is shown training neural networks using provably robust training algorithms results in overfitting, and hence, decreases the overall fault tolerance. Hence, fault tolerance and adversarial robustness are at odds with each other. Under the privacy threat model, the fault tolerance of private models trained using Differential Privacy is evaluated and it is shown that private models exhibit fault tolerance for a careful choice of hyperparameters. Hence, fault tolerance can be achieved by privately training models. This is validated theoretically by showing the relation between the leakage bound of a privately trained model and bound for fault tolerance. As shown in Figure 3 , the model on training using adversarially robust algorithm overfits significantly compared to model trained using natural Stochastic Gradient Descent. In this particular architecture, the generalisation error of robust models is about 17% compared to 9% error of naturally trained model.
